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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE ()F UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF \ 
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIA- )1 
TION, Plainliff and Respondent, 
VS, I 
EZRA C. LUNDAHL, INC., E. \ Case No. 
11359 CORDELL LUNDAHL, SHYR-\ 1· 
LEEN B. LUNDAHL, EZRA C. 
LUNDAHL and LEATHA A. 
LUNDAHL, I 
Defendants and Appellants. 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to recover on a deposited check which 
was dishonored by the Payor Bank but not charged 
back nor notice given the depositor, and a counter claim 
by the depositor growing out of said transaction. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VEll COURT 
A verdict by the jury was returned in favor of ail 
Defendants, but a judgment was granted by the court 
to both parties. 
RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of judgment granted Lo 
Plaintiff against Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., is a small 
corporation with its principal place of business in Logan, 
Utah and the Defendants, E. Cordell Lundahl and 
Ezra C. Lundahl, are two of its owners and operators. 
The Defendants, Shyrleen B. Lundahl and Leathn 
A. Lundahl, are the wives of E. Cordell Lundaltl allll 
Ezra C. Lundahl. 
The Lundahl Corporation has, for many years 
prior to this lawsuit, operated in Logan, Utah, for tbe 
purpose of building and manufacturing farm machiner)· 
and selling and disposing of same. It was so e11gagetl 
in the summer of 1966. Its bank was the First Security 
Bank of Utah N .A., Logan Branch. The individual 
Lundahls in the month of l\'lay, 1964, gave to the Bank 
a written guaranty (Pl. Ex. 2) for the Lundahl Cor-
poration accounts. 
2 
rn the month of July, 1966, the defendants sold 
snTral pieces of equipment to the Heathfield Equip-
ment Ltd., of Kamloops, British Columbia (Tr. D4). 
}ti each instance, they received a check for said sale, 
ont> of which was in the amount of $8,121.88 (Tr. 94). 
The check in the amount of $8,121.88 so received 
by the defendants was deposited to the corporation 
account (Tr. 94) on July 28th, 1966 (Def. Ex. 16-
sce back for detail) . This check was charged back by 
!lie Hank to Defendant corporation's account on August 
Ist. 1966, ( llank' s copy of charge back, Def. Ex. 17). 
:\o notice was ever given to the Defendants or lheir 
agents, nor was the check returned (Tr. 96, 135, 136, 
I07, 194, 195 and 196). The chargeback of this lost 
check caused an overdraft and E. Cordell Lundahl, 
on demand from the Bank, signed a note for the amount 
of this check ( R. 96) . 
Co11siderable effort was made by both the Bank 
and Lundahls to get a new check to replace the check 
that was lost. On November 15, 1966, by letter (Pl. 
Ex. 1) a new check in the amount of $8,100.00 was 
scut to Lundahls. This check (P. Ex. 11) for $8,100.00 
\\"as deposited to the Lundahl corporation account on 
December 5th, 1966, (Pl. Ex. 3, Tr. 102) and the 
monies placed directly in the Lundahl corporation 
lll'COtmt. 
\Vhile all of the above was taking place the Lund-
ahls were attempting to sell their business to Hesston 
L'orporation and a contract was finally entered into on 
3 
July 29th, 1966, (Def. Ex. 19) which, besides other 
provisions, provided (paragraph 4) that on or before 
December 1st, 1966, Hesston would deposit with plai 11 _ 
tiff, in escrow, $187,000.00, which sum would be held 
by the Bank for disposition in accordance with the 
terms of the contract. 
Paragraph 5 (a) provided that: Prior to .January 
1st, 1967, Lundahls shall fully pay, satisfy or obta1u 
release of all debts, wages, accounts, taxes, liabilitifs 
which are owed by or outstanding against Lundahls. 
Paragraph 5 ( c) provided that: Lundahls shall 
furnish to Hesston and to the Hank, proof acceptable 
to each of them certifying that Lundahl has 1111 
creditors. 
Paragraph 8 set out this: 
''On January 2, HW7, prm·ided sellers ]me 
complied with the provisions of paragraph 5 
hereof, Hesston shall direct said Hank to pay un-
to Lundahl the sum of Eighty Seven Thousand 
( $8 7 ,000. 00) Dollars in full payment for the 
property sold to Hesston under paragraph t)(al 
hereof." 
The check of $8,100.00 (Pl. Ex. 11) which wa~ 
deposited to Lundahls' account on December 5. 19titi, 
(Pl. Ex. 3) was sent for collection to the Royal l~ank 
of Canada by said Plaintiff Bank as shown by its eol-
lection letter No. 34-13377 (Pl. Ex. 5) December .'i 
1966. The Plaintiff, First Security Bank, reccin·d 
notice dated December 9, 1966, (Pl. Ex. 6) from t!Ji 
4 
Hoyal Bank of Canada "that the check was dishonoured 
for non-sufficient funds on first presentation. '\Te will 
continue to hold for payment, unless vou instruct us 
otherwise." 
The Lundahls were not given notice by the Bank 
that the check was not paid when presented and they 
knew nothing of this fact when the Hesston people 
mel with the Lundahls and the .First Security Bank 
to close out the purchase of the Lundahl business. The 
meeting was set up for January 4, 1967, at the First 
Security Bank in Logan, Utah. Prior to this date, on 
December 30, 1966 (Tr. 103) the First Security Bank 
had addressed a letter to Lundahls setting out all direct 
obligations owed by Lundahls, being the amount of 
$75,648.73 (Def. Ex. 21) and also a letter setting out 
the contingent obligations owed by Lunclahls totaling 
$2,892.87 (Def. Ex. 23). No mention was made of any 
obligation for the check of $8,100.00 which had not been 
pai1l and this fact was "\vell known by the Bank but 
not known by the Lundahls (Tr. 105). At the meeting 
at the Bank on January 4, 1967, a letter of instruction 
was dictated and written by Hesston (Def. Ex. 20, 
Tr. 104-105) to the First Security Bank referring to 
its contract with Lundahls, a copy of which they had 
sent to the Bank. (Def. Ex. 19). Hesston, in said 
letter, referred to the amounts set out in Defendants' 
Exhibits 21 and 23, being the declared, direct and con-
tingent obligations owed or claimed owed by Lund-
ahls. It (Def. Ex. 20) directed transfers of certain 
monies to Lundahls pursuant t o paragraph 8 of 
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Lundahl-Hesston agreement (Def. Ex. 19) and di-
rected the Lundahls to make payment to the Bank of 
$78,648.73 for direct obligations and $2,892.87 of 
contingent obligations. The Bank, with full knowledge, 
still said nothing about the unpaid check of $8, 100.00 
that it had credited to the checking account of Lundahls 
and for which it had received a notice that it had not 
been paid on presentation (Tr. 105, 127, 128 and 204) 
The Lundahls, at the meeting January 4, 1967, 
contested the amount to be paid to the Bank shown 
on Defendants' Exhibit 21, and particularly the 
last item which represented a note signed for the "lost 
check" in the amount of $8,121.88. As a result of 
Defendants' objections the interest on the $8,121.88 
was deducted by the Plaintiff Bank and the pay-off 
was made as shown by Defendants' checks (Defend-
ants' Ex. 24). Mr. Salisbury of the Bank admitted 
(Tr. 61-62) that the interest was waived on that day. 
At this meeting of January 4, 1967, the Hesston 
deal was closed and the Lundahls paid to the ·First 
Security Bank, the Plaintiff herein, four checks (De-
fendants Ex. 24) for a total of $78,402.55 as payment 
in full of all of their obligations, both direct and con-
tingent and the Lundahls asked for the return of their 
guaranty and other papers (Pl. Ex. 2) (Tr. 132, 134, 
209 and 210). It was to be returned later with other 
papers. 
After this January 4, 1967, meeting, the Plaintiff 
6 
Bank received the following letters from the Royal 
Hank of Canada: 
(a) Plaintiff's exhibit 7, dated January u, 
19li7, being a letter referring to its previous letter of 
December 9, 1966, (Pl. Ex. 6) and the non-payment 
of the check. 
( b) Plaintiff's exhibit 8, dated February 1, 
1\)67, another letter regarding the same subject matter. 
( c) Plaintiff's exhibit 9, dated February o, 
1967, being another letter from the Royal Bank of 
Canada about said check. 
( d) Plaintiff's exhibit 10, dated .February 10, 
1967, being another letter from the Royal Bank of 
Canada about the check sent for collection by Plain-
tiff Bank on December 5, 1966, and this time the check 
of $8,100.00 was returned to the Plaintiff Bank. 
The Plaintiff Bank by letter dated February 20, 
1967 (Pl. Ex. 13) sent to Clay and Hancey, Certified 
Public Accountants for Lundahls, the check for 
$8,100.00 which was charged back to Lundahls' account 
as of that date and an overdraft created. The collection 
letter (Pl. Ex. 5) of First Security Bank has the Bank's 
rubber stamp marked upon it stating "returned unpaid 
February 23, 1967". A letter to the Lundahls from 
First Security Bank dated February 23, 1967 (Pl. 
Ex. 15) refers to the charge back and a withdrawal of 
$7,000.00 on February 13, 1967. In regard to this 
withdrawal the record shows (Tr. 91) that E. Cordell 
7 
Lundahl went to the Plaintiff Bank after a telephone 
call to his home which was received by his wife (Tr. 
91) and met Norman Salisbury. This took place about 
the 10th of February, 1967. Mr. Lundahl ~was told for 
the first time at this meeting that there was trouble 
about the check. They had a second visit about a week 
later (Tr. 92) where the Bank claimed that they had 
received the check back and wanted E. Cordell Lundahl 
to sign a note for it, which he refused to do. He state) 
that this meeting on the 10th of February, 1967, was 
the first time he had ever heard about any trouble witli 
this l)econd check. He talked with his father after the 
10th of February, 1967. His father (Tr. 206) says 
that when he was told for the first time that the check 
had not been paid, he was fearful that the Bank would 
"glom" onto the last of the money in the Bank, and 
on the 13th of February, 1967, he drew out $7,000.00. 
He left some money in the Bank for outstanding checks 
(Tr. 207). The amount left was $893.93 (Tr. 207) 
and the Bank obtained this sum when it charged the 
check back. 
From the above facts the Plaintiff Bank tiled a 
complaint against the Lundahls with two causes of 
action to which the Defendants answered and filed a 
counterclaim for the amount the Bank obtained when 
they charged the check back. 
From these facts and pleadings the court submitted 
to the jury the following interrogatories: (Rec. 37) 
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"I. Did the plaintiff exen.'ise reasonable, ordi-
nary care and proceed in good faith in han-
dling the transaction in question? Answer 
yes or no. 
2. If your answer to number one was no, then 
please set out here your detailed finding as to 
just how and in what respects, if any, said 
plaintiff was negligent or otherwise failed to 
perform, in handling such transaction, should 
you so find. 
3. If you made a finding in answer to the pre-
vious question then here consider the question 
of damage and award defendants such dam-
age, if any you find, as was proximately 
caused by plaintiff's omissions, if any you 
found. 
4. 'Vas there a complete accord and satisfac-
tion between the parties on or about January 
4, 1967, whereby all accounts were settled 
and compromised between the parties, in-
cluding a promise, if any you find, on the part 
of the bank to surrender up the written guar-
antee? Answer yes or no." 
To interrogatory No. 1, the jury answered: 
"No." 
To interrogatory No. 2 the jury answered: 
"I. We, the jury, find the First Security Bank 
was negligent when the first check went 
through the 'Bank' after the first deposit and 
was not identified as a foreign item. 
2. We find the Bank was negligent when the 
Bank didn't notify Lundhal's Inc. about the 
overdraft caused by the loss of the first check. 
9 
3. YV e find the Bank was negligent because thev 
failed to notify Lundhals Inc. in the tiin~ 
prescribed by law, or a reasonable time, about 
the second check not being honored by the 
Royal Bank of Canada." · 
To interrogatory No. 3, the jury answered: 
"We, the jury, find the amount of $8\)3.98 
which was taken by the bank from the account 
of Lundahls Inc. be awarded the defendants". 
To Interrogatory No .4, the jury answered: 
"'Ve, the jury, agree on the first part of ques-
tion No. 4. There was complete accord and satis-
faction between the parties on Jan. 4, 1967. We 
find that the guarantee was included in said 
agreement." (Rec. 44-45) 
The court approved the findings of the jury (Rec. 
68) and in substance held that the defendants because 
of said jury's findings, were entitled to a judgment of 
$893.93, the amount taken by the Bank when the 
chargeback was made from the Defendants' account. 
However, the court two weeks later and on motion of 
the Plaintiff, gave to Plaintiff a judgment of $7,20(i.07 
and directed that Defendants' judgment be subtracted 
from Plaintiff's judgment and Plaintiff be given a 
judgment of $6,312.14, together with interest at 6;'~ 
per annum from February 20, 1967. (Rec. 76). It 
is from this latter judgment and the Findings and 
Conclusions of the court upon which that judgment 
is based that this appeal is taken. 
10 
STATE1\1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT HAVING EXPRESSLY 
ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY 
WAS BOUND TO FIND A NO CAUSE OF 
ACTION ON BOTH PLAINTIF}''S FIRST 
AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION AND 
NOT ITS SECOND CAUSE ONLY. 
A. THE JURY HA YING FOUND THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF BANK \VRONGFULL Y TOOK 
FRUM THE DEFENDANTS $893.93 \VHEN" 
THE PLAINTIFF CHARGED BACK TO 
DEFENDANTS' BANK AC C 0 U N T A 
CHECK FOR $8,100.00, WHICH CHARGE 
BACK NOT ONLY TOOK FROM DEFEND-
ANTS' BANK ACCOUNT $893.93 BUT 
CAUSED AN OVERDRAFT OF $7,206.07, 
AND THE JURY HAVING FOUND THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN SUCH 
TRANSACTION, IT \VAS ERROR FOR 
THE COURT TO GRANT THE NEGLI-
GENT PLAINTIFF A JUDGMENT FOR 
SAID OVERDRAFT OF $7,206.07 GRU\V-
ING OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION. 
B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFF $7,206.07 
FOR AN OVERDRAFT CREATED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENT 
11 
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TRANSACTION 'VAS CLEARLY ERROR 
AND CONTRARY TO THE JURY'S F1ND-
ING OF FACT WHICH HELD TI-IAT ALL 
ACCOUNTS BETWEEN THE PLAINTUF 
AND DEFENDANT \VERE SETTLED II\ 
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION O~ 
JANUARY 4, 1967. 
C. THE COURT, AFTER HAYING ADOPTED 
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THERE 
WAS A COMPLETE ACCORD AND SAT-
ISFACTION BETWEEN THE PART1E~ 
ON J ANDARY 4th, 1967, ERRED 'VHEN l'1 
DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT AGAINST ONLY THE INDI-
VIDUAL DEFENDANTS AND NOT 
AGAINST THE CORPORATE DEFEND-
ANT AS WELL. 
D. THE COURT HA YING REQUESTED THE 
JURY TO MAKE SPECIAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT IS BOUND TO APPLY THOSE 
FINDINGS TO ALL ISSUES OF FACT 
\VHICH T H 0 S E JURY FINDINGS 
'VOULD DETERMINE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPHE-
TATION OF THE UNIFORM C01\il\1ERCIAL 









(1958), AND IN NOT DISTINGUISHING BE-
TWEEN A RIGHT TO "CHARGE BACK" AND 
A RIGHT TO "REFUND." 
A. \VHILE U'l'AH CODE 70A-4-212 PRO-
Y IDES THAT A BANK HAS A RIGHT TO 
A "CHARGE BACK" EVEN IF IT ACTS 
NEGLIGENTLY, IT ALSO CLEARLY 
PROVIDES THAT A BANK LOSES SUCH 
RIGHT IF IT DOES NOT "ACT BY ITS 
MIDNIGHT DEADLINE OR vVITHI:i'-T A 
LONGER REASON ABLE TilVIE AFTER lT 
LEARNS THE FACTS," AND THE JUR¥ 
EXPRESSLY FOUND THAT THE BA:N.h. 
FAILED TO NOTIFY LUNDAHL'S, lNC., 
"\\TITHIN THE TilVIE PRESCRIBED ny· 
LA'V OR A REASONABLE TI.ME ABOUT 
THE SECOND CHECK NOT BEING HON-
ORED BY THE ROYAL BANK OF CAN-
ADA, THE BANK'S RIGHT TO CHARGE 
BACK WAS LOST. 
B. THE UTAH CODE PROVIDES THAT A 
BANK HAS A RIGHT TO A "REFUND" 
ONLY 'i\THERE THE BANK IS NOT NEG-
LIGENT, AND THE JURY AND COURT 
HAVING EACH EXPRESSLY FOUND 
THE BANK WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS 
HANDLING OF DEFENDATS' CHECK, 





THE COURT HAYING EXPUE~SL1 
ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF THE J lJH\ 
WAS BOUND TO FIND A NO CAUSE O/ 
ACTION ON BOTH PLAINTIFF'S F1US'1 
AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION AND 
NOT ITS SECOND CAUSE ONLY. 
A. THE JURY HAVING FOUND THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF BANK WRONGFULLY TOOK 
FRO.M THE DEFENDANTS $893.93 \VHEK 
THE PLAINTIFF CHARGED BACK TO 
DEFENDANTS' BANK AC C 0 U N T A 
CHECK FOR $8,100.00, \VHICH CHAHG1 
BACK NOT ONLY TOOK FROlVI DEFEND-
ANTS' BANK ACCOUNT $893.93 .BL'T 
CAUSED AN OVERDRAFT OF $7,206.07, 
AND THE JURY HAVING FOUND THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT IN SUCH 
TRANSACTION, IT WAS ERROR FOR 
THE COURT TO GRANT THE NEGLI-
GENT PLAINTIFF A JUDGMENT FOR 
SAID OVERDRAFT OF $7,206.07 GROW-
ING OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION. 
The lower court attempted to reconcile two irrecon 
cilable nositions. This resulted in the untenable situa-
tion of L the court adopting and sustaining the special 
findings of the jury, which were all found in fayor 
14 
of the defendant, while the court at the same time and 
based upon the same isolated transaction, granted a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
The lower court expressly accepted and sustained 
the special findings of fact by the jury, and said so on 
seYeral occasions. At the first meeting of the court 
and counsel following the jury verdict, on June 10, 
Hl68, the court stated (Tr. 280): 
"I want to announce publicly and on the record 
that I propose to receive this verdict unless some-
body can talk me out of it." 
Two weeks later, on June 24, 1968, the court agam 
stated (TR. 297) : 
"'Vell, gentlemen, in this case I guess tpe 
court will have to resolve the matter in order that 
one of the parties may appeal. First of all, the 
court accepts in its entirety the findings and con-
clusions of fact made by the jury ... " 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the 
court stated (Rec. 68) : 
"And, the court, having considered said Special 
Verdict as returned by said jury, approves said 
findings, and now enters its o,wn Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law ... " 
The court also stated in Finding No. 18 (Rec. 73) : 
"The court finds that the special findings and 
verdict of the jury are true and correct." 
This, then is not a case where the court has granted 
a Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict, or for some 
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other reason has reversed the findings of the jury, fo" 
here the court expressly adopted the jury findings a) 
true and correct. Yet, after such explicit staternenb 
by the court, it nullified those very findings by its erro-
neous judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The cour\ 
requesetd the jury to make special findings of fad 
on four issues, and there should be no confusio11 c011 _ 
cerning their findings, for due to the court's proptr 
requirement that the ambiguous statement "we feel" 
be replaced by "we find", the jury restated and em-
phasized their unanimous findings in open court. TR. 
270-275). The interrogatories and the answers of the 
jury are set out in full at the conclusion of the state-
ment of facts. 
A clear and careful reading of the jury findings 
is convincing proof that the jury were unanimousl~­
convinced that the Plaintiff Bank was negligent in its 
handling of both checks of the Defendants. 'The jury 
further found that as a result of the negligent trans-
actions, the Bank lost its legal right to charge back 
the $893.93 taken from the Defendants' Bank account 
and required a return of that amount to the Defendant. 
The court in its Conclusions of Law No. 5 (Rec. 74) 
expressly found the facts to be as stated by the jury: 
"That the plaintiff 'vas negligent in certain 
respects in its handling of said 2nd check." 
The court also found, in Finding of Fact No. 8 (Rec. 
70): 
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"That plaintiff failed to notify Lundahls Inc. 
in the manner prescribed by law or a reasonable 
time about Check . Two not being honored by 
the Royal Bank of Canada . . . ,, 
rel, even after acknowledging the negligence of the 
Plaintiff Bank, the court awarded it a judgment for 
$7,:W6.07, the full amount requested in its pleadings. 
The determination resulted in a ridiculous paradox, 
with the court requiring the Bank to return all the 
money it took from the Defendants' bank account, while 
at the same time awarding to the Bank all the money 
it tried to take but could not get. In other words, it 
was to the benefit of the negligent Bank that the full 
$8,100.00 was not in the Defendants' bank account 
when the check was charged back, for the Bank \Vas 
required to return all that it had taken. And if all of 
the money had been taken, it would all have had to 
have been returned. 
It is a preposterous proposition to argue that such 
a contradictory determination is in accordance with 
law and justice. For there was only one transaction 
involved, and either the Bank was negligent or it wa~ 
not. If it was, it must suffer the legal consequences of 
its act. And that consequence is spelled out in the 
Gniform Commercial Code, recently adopted as Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, Title 70A, which provisions 
are discussed in Point II herein. The jury found the 
Bank was negligent. The court adopted the jury find-
ing and also made its own independent finding that 
the Bank was negligent in its actions. Therefore, it 
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is abundantly clear that the Bank must meet the legal 
consequences of its act, as provided in the U niforrn 
Commercial Code. 
To require the .Bank to return the $89~Hl3 takeu , 
while at the same time awarding it the $7,206.07 not 
taken, is certainly not consistent nor fair. The .Banh 
was the party found negligent, not the Defendant~, 
yet it was allowed by the court to benefit by its negli-
gent act. The obvious intent of the jury was to fully 
reimburse the Defendant for all that it had lost by 
the improper charge back of the Bank, yet the coun 
erroneously attempted to "divide the pie" instead of 
awarding it to one party or the other as justice required. 
It is not justice nor the intent of the law to ask both 
parties to share in a loss where only one party is at 
fa ult. Here the only reasonable conclusion is that sirn:t 
the jury and the court required the Bank to return tl1~ 
$893.93 wrongfully taken, the Bank cannot possibly 
be entitled to an additional $7,206.07 lost by its neg-
ligent act. 
B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COl'RT 
AWARDING TO THE PLAINTIFF $7.~06.07 
FOR AN OVERDRAFT CREATED HY 
THE PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENT 
TRANSACTION WAS CLEARLY ERROR 
AND CONTRARY TO THE JURY'S FIND-
ING OF FACT WHICH HELD THAT ALL 
ACCOUNTS BET,VEEN THE PLAINTJFI1' 
AND DEFENDANT WERE SETTLED IN 
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AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION ON 
J ANDARY 4, 1967. 
The jury made a specific finding concerning the ex-
tent of the accord and satisfaction. (Rec. 45, Rec. 67) : 
"4. Was there a complete accord and satisfac-
tion between the parties on or about January 
4, 1967, whereby all accounts were settled and 
compromised between the parties, including a 
promise, if any you find, on the part of the bank 
to surrender up the written guaranty? Answer 
Yes or No." 
"Answer: We, the jury, agree on the first part 
of Question No. 4-there was complete accord 
and satisfaction between the parties on Jan. 
4, 1967. We find that the guaranty was included 
in this said agreement." (Emphasis added) . 
Here the jury's finding determined that all accounts 
between the parties were settled as of January 4th, 1967. 
But the court, even though expressly adopting those 
findings, ruled to the contrary and reversed the jury's 
finding of fact. (Rec. 72) . In its Finding of Fact No. 
15 the court held that the defendant corporation and 
the individual named Defendants entered into an agree-
ment with the Hesston Corporation, Inc., which re-
quired that the Defendants "obtain releases of all debts, 
wages, accounts, taxes, liabilities and other obligations 
which were owed or outstanding against them", and that 
pursuant to that agreement the interested buyer, Hess-
ton Corporation, Inc., deposited certain monies in 
' Plaintiff Bank in consideration thereof, to be used to 
19 
pay any indebtednesse owing by the Defendants, pril!-
cipally to the Plaintiff Bank. The court specitkdh 
concluded: 
"That included in said debts was a note from 
defendants to the Bank in the sum of $8,121.88 
representing Check One, which had been lost 
after having been sent to Defendants by the 
Bank, but Check Two in the sum of $8,100.0U ' 
was 'Specifically omitted from said settlement 
for reasons aforesaid, and was not a part of the 
accord and satisfaction which took place at a 
meeting which followed on January 4, 1967." 
(Emphasis added) . 
In Finding No. 16 the court further found: 
"Hesston Corporat~on, Inc. was delivered 
statements from the .First Security Bank setting 
out in full all liabilities which were owed bv the 
Defendants, both direct and contingent, being 
the sums to-wit: $75,648.73 and $2,892.97 (but 
which did not include Check Two) at which time 
the plaintiff agreed with the defendants in con-
sideration of immediate payment, to accept the 
sum of $75,509.78 on direct liabilities and the 
sum of $2,892.87 on contingent liabilities as iu 
an accord and satisfaction of all accounts due and 
owing to said Bank by the Defendants ... ' 
(Emphasis added) . 
The court submitted a specific interrogatory to the 
jury upon the precise issue involved here, but didn t 
like the answer the jury arrived at, so disregarded thr 
jury determination. The court is not free to disregard 
the jury findings, as is more fully discussed in Point 
ID, infra. 
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The court clearly stated the reason for submitting 
thi~ interrogatory at the time it instructed the jury 
as to how to make its findings. The court instructed 
the jury that the burden of proof on all of the ques-
tions, one through four, was on the Defendant (Rec. 
37), which burden the Defendant met according to 
the answers of the jury. The court then added: (In-
struction Number 4, Rec. 42) : 
"The main reason we have the jury here is 
so that you may apply the rule of credibility: 
'Vho are you going to believe? You have a right 
and it's your duty to weigh the testimony of the 
witnesses and examine all the written exhibits 
and determine where the truth of the case lies. 
There is no magic formula that I can tell you 
how to determine who to believe and where the 
truth is in this case, and that's why the jury 
system exists. "\Ve bring in eight disinterested 
persons and ask them to find out and determine 
who's told the truth, to us street language, which 
of these exhibits are entitled to credibility, and 
a fair and just verdict render in the interests of 
justice. You observe the witnesses on the stand, 
you observe their demeanor, you observe their 
interest in the result of the case or the lack of 
it, and you yourself must resolv~ that." 
The jury, following the court's instruction, obviously 
believed the Defendants' story and disbelieved the 
Plaintiffs. But the court then disregarded the jury 
verdict and made its own finding which is directly con-
tray to the jury's finding. When challenged on this 
aetion by counsel for the Defendant the following 
colloquy took place: 
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(Tr. 302): 
"~R: MANN: \Vell, then what good wa~ 
the JU!'Y, Judge 1 \Vhat good was any returu ur 
followmg up of the jury? 
. T!IE COURT: VV ~11, that p~rticular thmg 
1 
d1dn t need to be submitted to a Jury. I'll hare 
to concede that, because there's no question but ' 
what the bank got the 893 offset. That was just 
a waste of judicial effort, that part." 
As is discussed in Point ID, the court is bound by 
the jury's findings of fact, and here the court was clearly 
erroneous in finding contrary to the jury's findings of 
fact. 
C. THE COURT, AFTER HAVING ADOPTED 
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THERE 
WAS A COMPLETE ACCORD AND SAT-
ISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
ON JANUARY 4th, 1967, ERRED \VHEN IT 
DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFF'S COM- , 
PLAINT AGAINST ONLY THE INDI-
VIDUAL DEFENDANTS AND NO'l' 
AGAINST THE CORPORATE DEFEND-
ANT AS WELL. 
For a number of years the Bank had made large 
loans to the Defendant corporation, and in 1964< re· 
quested the individual Defendants, namely Ezra C. 
Lundahl and Leatha A. Lundahl, his wife, and E. 
Cordell Lundall and Shyrleen B. Lundahl, his wife, 
to sign a guarantee. The individual Defendants did 
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sign a guarantee on May 20, 1964, which guaranteed 
that they would individually insure payment on any 
debts incurred by the corporation up to $110,000.0J 
if the corporation defaulted. (Exhibit No. 2). The 
.Jlll'Y expressly found that the guarantee was discussed 
at the accord and satisfaction meeting on January 4, 
1967, and that the guarantee was to be returned to the 
individual Defendants by the Bank. (R. 45, and also 
i1t Rec. 67) : 
The jury had been instructed earlier by the judge 
io determine which witnesses were telling the trulh. 
(Rec. 42, Instruction No. 4) . 
The jury obviously believed the Defendants' ver-
sion of the facts in requiring that the guarantee must 
be returned. The court also made specific findings con-
cerning the guarantee. (Rec. 71-73) . Finding No. 14 
recites the backround of the guarantee. Finding No. 
lU held (Rec. 72 and 73 No. 16): 
"16. That on or about the 4th day of January, 
1967, a meeting was held in the First Security 
Bank at Logan, Utah, wherein Hesston Cor-
poration, Inc., was delivered statements from 
the First Security Bank setting out in full all 
liabilities which were owed by the Defendants, 
both direct and contingent, being the sums, to-
wit: $75,648.73 and $2,892.87 (but which did 
not include Check Two,) at which time the Plain-
tiff agreed with the Defendants, in consideration 
of immediate payment, to accept the sum of 
$75,509.78 on direct liabilities and the sum of 
$2,892.87 on countingent liabilities as an accord 
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and ~atisfaction of all ac.counts due and owing 
to said Bank ~y the .Defend3:nts, which agreed 
amounts were irmuedmtely paid by the Defend-
ants to Plaintiff as a payment in full satisfactio11 
of all liabilities whatsoever that the plaintiff had 
against the Defendants or any of them, except 
for said Check Two of $8,100.00, which had not 
then been returned unpaid. 1lhat at said time the 
Plaintiff agreed to deliver to said Def cnda11t8 
the guaranty, a copy of which is attached to 
Plaintiff's complaint and marked "Exhibit A' 
and paid notes. The Plaintiff, after said time, 
returned the notes, but said guaranty has never 
been returned to the Defendants, and the Plain-
tiff is estopped from using or asserting any righb 
under said purported guaranty." (Emphasis 
added). 
Once again both the jury and the judge found for 
the Defendant on an issue where the credibility of the 
parties was involved. Yet the final judgment of the 
court implies the Defendants were dishonest in some 
unexplained way. 
The guaranty was obviously for the benefit of the 
Bank. It is inconceivable that the Bank would agree 
to yield up a guarantee binding the individual De-
fendants if it believed the Corporate Defendant was 
still indebted to it on a legitimate claim. The finding 
of the court and of the jury are absolute that the guar-
antee was discussed during the meeting on January 
4th, 1967, and that the Bank agreed to yield up the 
guarantee. The Defendants at that time believed the 
check had been paid, as they had never received notice 
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of dishonor, a fact determined by both the court and 
by the jury. And since the De.fondant was unaware 
the check had not been paid, the burden was upon the 
Plaintiff Bank to list it with all of the other direct and 
contingent liabilities of Defendant. But it is an un-
disputed fact that the check was never listed. The 
silence of the Bank cannot be ignored, especially where 
its silence was to hide its own negligence. It received 
over $78,000.00 from Hesston Corporation as final 
settlement of all claims, direct and contingent, owing 
by Lundahl' s Inc. to the Bank, and the Bank feared 
that if it suddenly tried to recover for a check which 
was even then nearly one month late in being charged 
back, that the Defendants or Hesston Corporation or 
both would become disgusted with the Bank and caH 
off the whole settlement. The Bank was anxious to get 
its hands on the $78,000.00 right away, so never did 
raise the issue of the second check's dishonor until 
well after the arrangement with Hesston was final 
and could not be revoked. Yet it tried to recover from 
all of the Defendants, and even in court denied it had 
ever agreed to yield up the guarantee signed by the 
individual Defendants. When the jury and the court 
found that the Bank had in fact agreed to yield up 
that guarantee they had to believe the Defendants' 
version of the facts. And to later allow the Bank, who 
misstated the true facts, to recover on the check they 
did not dare discuss at the proper time, is directly con-
tradictory to the effect of the other findings. The Bank 
should be estopped to deny its silence, and should be 
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refused a recovery on the check against the Corporate 
Defendant just as it was against the individual De-
fendants. 
D. THE COURT HAVING REQUESTED THE 
JURY TO ~IAKE SPECIAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT IS BOUND TO APPLY THOSE 
FINDINGS TO ALL ISSUES OF FACT 
WHICH T H 0 SE JURY FINDINGS 
WOULD DETERMINE. 
0 btaining a special verdict from a jury is a time 
honored method of determining the facts of the case 
in Utah. In 1885 the Supreme Court of Utah, in the 
case of Smith vs. Ireland, 7 P. 749, distinguished be-
tween general and special verdicts. There the court 
stated: 
"In case of a general verdict the court states 
the law applicable to the facts before they are 
found by the jury, and in a special verdict the 
jury finds the facts first and the court declares 
the law applicable to them afterwards. In either 
case the jury is judge of the facts and the court 
of the law." 
Yet in this case the court is assuming both rolc1 
and seeks to be the "Judge of the Facts" as well as of 
the law. Further on in that same decision the court 
states the general rule: 
"The authorities are to the effect that the court 
will not set aside a verdict unless satisfied it i;; 
against a clear preponderance of the evidence. 
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The lower court here agreed with and adopted the 
jury's findings, so had no basis for setting them aside. 
Later Utah decisions have further defined the re-
lationship between the judge and the jury and the 
duties of each where a special verdict is involved. In 
the case of Petty vs. Clark, 129 P 2<l 568 ( 1942), the 
jury was requested by the court to answer six special 
interrogatories concerning what statements were in-
dude<l in a contract for a sale of a drugstore. Ti;c 
jury found by a vote of six to two that a certain r;ara-
graph was not a part of the contract, but the eourt 
disagreed, believing that the paragraph in question 
was a part of the contract. The court concluded that 
the case was in equity, and that the decision of the 
jury was not binding, but only advisory. Upon appeal 
the Supreme Court reversed that determination stating: 
(page 569, right hand column) 
"There was sufficient evidence to justify the 
jury's findings; the findings of the jury are, 
therefore governing in the case." 
Defending the parties' rights to a constitutionally 
guaranteed jury trial, the court added: (page 570, left 
hand column) 
"Where the issues are legal issues, the fact 
that equitable relief may be prayed for, to carry 
into effect the judgments based upon the legal 
issues, is not sufficient to deprive either party 
of his rights to have the legal issues submitted to . ,,-
a Jury. 
27 
This decision carefully pin-points the divisiou uf 
duties of the court and jury in a case involving a spet:ial 
verdict, clearly holding that the jury properly <leeides 
the issues of fact where an equitable claim is joined 
with the legal claims. In our case, the lower eourl 
finally turned to equity for support for its decisioll . 
In its original Findings of Fact the court listed sixtecu 
findings, but it later amended the findings to inelude , 
seventeen through nineteen. In finding number seven-
teen the court stated: (Rec. 73) 
" ... the corporate defendant has been aud will 
continue to be unjustly enriched unless com-
pelled to make repayment to the bank for the 
amount of Check Two, less the amount received 
by the Bank by charge back and less the dam-
ages fixed by the jury." (Emphasis added) . 
How could the Defendant possibly have been "uu· 
justly enriched"? The Bank took money from the De· 
fendants' account, and both the jury and the court 
found that the money was improperly taken by the 
Bank. They impliedly found that the Bank was ''m1-
justly enriched" by that amount, and required a return 
of the money to prevent the Bank from being unjust!) 
enriched. The Bank being neligent, and taking mone~ 
that did not belong to it, had to give it back. The 
$893.93 it was required to return was only part of 
the $8,100.00 lost by the Bank's negligence. The other 
$7 ,206.07 was another part of the same total, and 1 
there is no reason to treat the two amounts different!~-. 
for the total amount was lost by the one isolated trans-
action. 
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A similar situation arose in the case of King vs. 
rets Cab Inc., 295 P2d 605 (Kansas 1956). There 
the lower court set aside a special finding of fact by 
the jury and entered a judgment for the plaintiff, 
contrary to the jury findings. The Kansas Supreme 
Court said in reversing the judgment: (page 610 left 
hand column) 
''The court set aside the answer to special 
question No. 1. Apparently the court felt that 
the answer was not definite and certain, was am-
biguous, and left to speculation what the jury 
meant by its answer when considered with the 
answer to special question No. 2, and the general 
verdict. After setting aside that answer, the 
court entered judgment on the general verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff. This it could not do. 
Assuming that the answer to question No. 1 was 
a finding of negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff, the trial court could not ignore specific sepa-
rate findings which would bar recovery, and con-
sider only the finding of negligence on the part 
of defendant and render judgment on the latter. 
To do so, the trial court would be substituting 
its judgment for that of the jury, thereby deny-
ing the defendant the right to a trial by jury 
on the issue of contributory negligence." (Em-
phasis added) . 
Utah Rule 49(a) governing special verdicts is pat-
terned after and is exactly the same wording as Rule 
-1<9 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Federal Rule has been interpreted on many occasions, 
as discussed in the treatise Federal Practice and Prn-
cnl 11 rc, by Barron and Holtzoff, Volume 2B. Follow-
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ing are several comments included there which <lefilli 
the application of this rule: 
'·And of outstanding importance is the laci 
that the definite factual findings furnish a prac 
tical, concrete basis for the appellate court 1 
evaluation of the case on review. If the onh 
error involves a point of law or a misapplicatiu1 
of law to the facts by the trial judge, the necei· 
sity for a new trial should be eliminated." IP.' 
330). 
That statement would indicate that the findings ot 
the court in this case should be reversed and that a ne11 
trial is not necessary, for the findings of the jury are 
clear and unequivocable, and the only error is the mis· 
application of law by the court. 
"If there is conflict in the answers given by the 
jury it is not the province of the court to make 
additional findings of fact in an attempt to recon· 
cile the answers. 
If the jur;y finds the facts on the controlli1111 
issues, and there is no contradictory finding, tlti' 
court is authorized, under Rule S8, to enta 11 11 
appropriate ;udgment on the special verdict in j 
conformity u;ith the ;ury findings." ( P. 351-3j21. ! 
(Emphasis added) . 
"A judgment entered on a special verdicl 
should not be set aside u 11lcss the ansu;ers on tltt 
specific issues are clearl.11 against tlze u;eiqht o! · 
the ei..'idence. It has been held that if special issues . 
were submitted to the jury without object~on. a 
party may not complain on appeal that the Jury' 
findings were opposed to the weight and pre· 
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pon<lerance of the evidence." ( P. 353) ( Empha-
sis added) . 
In 53 Am. J ur. 758, Trial, Sec. 1094, the concept 
of '"minimum correction" by a court is discussed: 
"VVhile the practice of amending verdicts in 
matters of form is one of long standing, based 
on principles of the soundest public policy in 
the furtherance of justice, it is strictly limited 
tu cases where the jury have expressed their 
meaning in an informal manner. rPhe co,urt has 
no power to supply substantial omissions, a;id 
the amendment in all cMes must be such as to 
make the verdict conform to the real intent of 
the jury. The judge cannot, under the guise of 
amending the verdict, invade the province of the 
jur,1; or substitute his verdict fur theirs. After the 
amendment the verdict must be not what the 
judge things it ought to have been, but what 
the the jury intend it to be. Their actual intent, 
and not his notion of what they ought to have 
intended, is the thing to be expressed and worked 
out by the amendment." (Emphasis added). 
One example of where the lower court reversed the 
the jury finding by alllending their answer is where 
the jury, in response to Interrogatory No. 4, found 
that there was a "complete accord and satisfaction 
between the parties." Yet the court concluded in its 
Findings of Fact, No. 15 and No. 16, (Rec. 72 and 
73) that the second check was not included in the accord 
and satisfaction, which statement is definitely beyond 
and contrary to the findings of the jury. 
The authorities further state: 
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"In jury trial cases it is the sole peculiar pr01 
ince and function of the jury to determi11e or 
decide disputed claims and questions of fact 
arising in the case before it, and the law does nui 
countenance any invasion or usurpation b,1; ti
11 
court. of this p~·ovince and function of the jur
11 
to weigh_ the evidence and find the facts. The jun 
have a right to draw from proved circumstance1 
such conclusions as are natural and reasonahle. 
( P. 144) (Emphasis added) . 
The court declared the Defendant did not act 111 
good faith when it withdrew its own money out of ill 
checking account some two and a half months after !I 
deposited the $8,100.00 check. Yet the jury heard all 
the same evidence that the court heard, and in their 
answer to Interrogatory No. 4 they unanimously found 
the Defendant was "proximately" damaged by th1 
Plaintiff by the full amount of money the Defenda11t 
took. The Plaintiff was found to be negligent, and the• 
jury determined that all accounts were settled betwet:1 
the parties during the accord and satisfaction meetin~ 
on January 4th, 1967. These findings cannot he cfo· · 
regarded and tossed aside by the court to allow it tn 
make its own findings on the very issues settled by the I 
JUry. 
The authorities are all agreed that such question1 
as "good faith" and "knowledge of events" are for tht · 
jury to determine, not for the court to decide. (Ser , 
e.g., 53 Am. Jur. 191, sec. 223, and page 192, sec. 22H 
One of the great strengths of the American systeDI 
of justice is that an idividual' s motives can be impartial!) 
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determined by a jury comprised of his fellow citizens 
rather than by a single judge. Here the jury answers 
are clear and unequivocal, and no single judge shoul<l 
be allowed to reverse their findings without a showing 
that they are obviously in error-and no such showing 
has been made here. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRE-
'IATION OF THE UNIFORM COMJHERCl . .:'.iL 
CODE, 70A-4-212 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
(1953), AND IN NOT DISTINGUISHING BE-
'l'\VEEN A RIGHT TO "CHARGE BACK" AND 
A RIGHT TO "REFUND." 
A. 'VHILE UTAH CODE 70A-4-212 PRO-
YIDES THAT A BANK HAS A RIGHT TO 
A "CHARGE BACK" EVEN IF IT ACTS 
NEGLIGENTLY, IT ALSO CLEARLY 
PROVIDES THAT A BANK LOSES SUCH 
RIGHT IF IT DOES NOT "ACT BY ITS 
l\IIDNIGHT DEADLINE OR WITHIN A 
LONGER REASONABLE TIME AFTER IT 
LEARNS THE FACTS," AND THE JURY 
EXPRESSLY FOUND THAT THE BANK 
FAILED TO NOTIFY LUNDAHL'S, INC., 
\VITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY 
LA'V OR A REASONABLE TI~fE ABOUT 
THE SECOND CHECK NOT BEING HON-
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ORED BY THE ROY AL BANK OF C .. \X 
ADA, THE BANK'S RIGHT TO CHAHGt 
BACK WAS LOST. 
The Plaintiff below relied upon Utah Code Ali· 
notated 70A-4-212 as authority for its claim that 
it had a right to charge back to the depositor's account 
the full amount of the deposited check. This sectio11 
clearly does provide a collecting bank a right to charge 
back an item as long as a settlernent rernains pruri-
sional between the bank and the depositor. But as soon 
as any settlement becomes final the bank loses its righl : 
to charge back and, will from that time forward be 
considered the owner of the check. 70A-4-212 ( 1) pro-
vides: 
"Right of charge-back or refund.-( 1) If a 
collecting bank has made provisional settlement 
with its customer for an item and itself fails by 
reason of dishonor, suspension of payments by 
a bank or otherwise to receive a settlement for 
the item which is or becomes final, the bank may 
revoke the settlement given by it, charge back 
the amount of any credit given for the item to I 
its customer's account or obtain refund from ill 
customer whether or not it is able to return the ! 
items if by its rnidnight deadline or with~n a ' 
longer reasonable time after it learns the facts : 
it returns the items or sends notification of tli 1 : 
facts. These ri,qhts to revoke, charge-bad" and 
obtain refund terminate if and when a settlemc111 
for the item received by the bank is or becomes 
final (subsection (3) of section. 70A-4-211 a.nd. 
subsections (2) and (3) of section 70A-4-2JH). 
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It is there provided that a bank's right to revoke, 
charge-back or obtain refund are conditional: the right 
must be exercised before the provisional settlement for 
an item becomes final, and the bank must give notifi-
cation of dishonor to the customer by its midnight 
Jeadline or within a longer reasonable time. This section 
also provides that a settlement becomes final by meeting 
the conditions specified in either 4-211 ( 3) or 4-213-
( 2) or ( 3). 
A clear reading of these sections is convincing 
proof that that bank here allowed the provisional settle-
ment to become final by failing to meet the following 
conditions: 
A. the bank did not give notification of dis-
honor by its midnight deadline or within a 
longer reasonable time as required by 4-212 
(1), above. 
B. the bank did not meet the midnight dead-
line requirement of 4-211 ( 3) ( c). 
C. the bank received a final settlement, accord-
ing to the provisions of 4-211 ( 3) ( c), making 
the bank accountable to its customer for the 
full amount of the item, according to the pro-
visions of 4-213 ( 3). 
The provisions of 4-212 ( l) are set out above. 
The provisions of 4-211 ( 3 ( c) are as follows: 
" ( 3) A settlement for an item by. m:ans of 
a remittance instrument or authorization to 
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charge is or becomes a final settlement as to bot), 




( c) If in a case not covered by subpara. 
graphs (a) ?r ( b) the person receiving tlit 
settlement fails to seasonably present, forwaru 
for collection, pay or return a remittance in 
strument or authorization to it to charge befor, 
i~s ~idnight deadline,-at such midnight dead.
1 
lme. · 
The provisions of 4-213 ( 3) are as follows: 
4-212 (3) 
If a collecting bank receives a settlement IOi 
an item which is or becomes final ( subsectior, 
(3) of section 70A-4-211, subsection (2) 01 
section 70A-4-213) the bank is accountable tr 
its customer for the amount of the item and 
any provisional credit given for the itern in a11 I 
account with its customer becomes final." 
The jury made specific findings that the bank wa\ 
"negligent because they failed to notify Lundahl's Im' 
in the time prescribed by law, or a reasonable time, ab011' • 
the second check not being honored by the Royal lla11i 
of Canada." (Finding No. 3 to Interrogatory No.: 
Rec. 44). 
The court not only approved the findings of th1 • 
jury (Rec. 68) , but also made its own findings: i 
"That the plaintiff was negligent in certai1_1 
respects in its handling of said second check. 
(Rec. 7 4, Conclusion of Law No. 5) . 
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I 
"That plaintiff failed to notify Lundahl's Inc. 
in the time prescribed by law or a reasonable 
time about Check Two not being honored by 
the Royal Bank of Canada ... " (Rec. 70, Find-
ing of Fact No. 8). 
These findings are conclusive proof that the require-
ments of 4-211 ( 3) { c), 4-212 ( 1), and 4-213 ( 3), above, 
1.
1 
were not met by the Bank. And since those require-
ments were not met, the "provisional" settlement auto-
matically became "final", and the Bank became the 
owner of the check-for better or for worse. It acted 
negligently, as the court and jury agreed, and mL1st 
accept the legal consequences of its negligence. 
Yes, despite the express statement of the Code 
upon these issues, the court failed to understand it, 
d as evidenced by the court's assumption that the "notice" 
11 I requirement of 4-212 ( 1) was not mandatory but 
optional. Continuing Finding No. 8, the Court stated 
(Rec. 70) : 
II 
" ... but the court specifically finds that the 
Defendants well knew or should have known of 
Heathfield's financial instability and either in-
solvency or pending insolvency and that the 
Plaintiff, except for said notice, kept Defend-
ants fully informed as to the status of Check 
Two . . . " (Emphasis added) . 
The court admits "notice" was not given, yet in 
the same sentence finds the Defendants were kept "fully 
informed." The contradiction in terms is too obvious 
lu believe the court understood the impact of what it 
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said! The very reason the authors of the U nifor1 ~, 
Commercial Code required specific notice of dish011111 
be given was to prevent such confusion as existed lier, 
where the Bank may have incorrectly assumed tli: 
Defendants were "on notice". Obviously the cour' 
here assurned the Defendq.nts were "on notice", for 
1
, 
stated that they "knew or should have known". Tlr 
court imputes negligence to the Defendants if t]w, 
1 
were unaware of what it believes the disputed fael· 
actually were, yet the Code does not allow such assump· 
tions. It requires that timely notice must be given b: 
the Bank or forfeit its right to revoke, charge-baeh. 
or refund. The Code wisely recognizes that often timt' 
timely notice will allow the depositor to contact th1 
debtor and make new arrangements to cover the deb! 
Here the Defendants and Mr. Heathfield all testitieJ 
that timely notice would have prevented any loss a1 
I 
all. But after two and a half months the conditions o: 
the debtor corporation had changed substantially, un· 
fortunately causing someone to bear the loss. And tl1t1 
I 
Code expressly provides that the loss falls upon tlr 
negligent party who fails to meet the required standar1l 
of giving notice. 
The court, again in disregard of the Code, furtht:' 
held (Rec. 73, Conclusion No. 2) : 
"That the provisions of the Commercial Codr 
do not cover a situation such as this ·where th1. 
bank customer solicits the aid and assistance oi 
the bank in securing and collection a replacemc111 
check for a prior lost check, where the customei 
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knew or should have known that the drawer of 
the check was in unsound financial straits and 
either insolvent or on the verge of insolvency." 
(Emphasis added) . 
Then the court expressly contradicted the strict re-
quirements of the Code by holding: 
(Rec. 74, Conclusion No. 3): 
"That even if the Comrnercial Code is applic-
able, the bank was not foreclosed from charging 
hack Check Two upon its return unpaid, even 
though it failed to use due care with respect to it, 
and that the corporate Defendant's remedy is 
in damages." (Emphasis added). 
That finding of the court is obviously contrary to 
the statutory requirements cited above, and contrary 
J, 
1 to the court's own finding that the bank failed to give 
ti 
the required notice. (Rec. 7, Finding No. 8) . These 
conclusions of law simply cannot be reconciled with 
the express provisions of Utah Code 70A-4-2ll, 4-212, 




Basing its decision upon all of these errors, the court 
concluded as a matter of law: (Rec. 7 4 conclusion No. 4) 
"That in either event, the plaintiff is entitled 
to a judgment against the corporate defendant 
as prayed for in his complaint, to-wit: $7,-
206.07." (Emphasis added). 
'I h ,(; "In either event" appears to acknowledge the fact t at 
thr !au;, does not allow such a charge back. There is no 
way in the world such a finding can be proper after 
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the jury had specifically found the Plaintiff was iw 
entitled to a charge-back. 
The Plaintiff below argued, and the court seemtu 
to agree, that the determination by the jury decide
1
1 
only the counter-claim and did not decide the claim 
of the Plaintiff. But the two claims are inseparabh 
connected, both arising from one isolated transactloi1. 
If the Plaintiff must return the amount it improp· 1 
erly charged back, it is because it did not comp!) 
with the statutory requirements. And if the Bank doe-
not qualify to recover the full amount of the dishonoreJ 
check, it cannot qualify to obtain any part of suci11 
amount. (70A-4-213 (3).) 
Therefore, the amount credited to the account of thr 
Defendant must automatically be held to have become: 
final account when the time limit for giving notice ex· 
pi red. The bank can then have no further rights at a~ 
against the Defendants to the $8,100.00, because whe11 
the settlement became final both parties were forerer 
bound in the position which they \Vere in at that time 
A charge back could not be justified because that right 
was lost w~e~ the provisi~nal settlem~nt ~ecame final I 
The authonties are unammous on this pomt. For ex, 
ample, see Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service. ( 
Forms-Procedures Volume, by Hart and 'Villier. I 
(1968 revision) paragraph 43.05 (2), page 4-164: 
"A collecting bank receiving a remittan~e must 
by its midnight deadline, either pay or dishonor , 




initiates its collection or forward it to its owner 
(Section 4-211 ( 2) ) . Otherwise, the settlement 
by remittance would become final at the expira-
tion of that time and the bank will become ac-
countable for the amount of the original item 
whether or not the proceeds are ever collected. 
(Section4-211(o) (a) (c)). (Emphasis added). 
ln addition see A Tran.Yactional Guide to the Uni-
J.' form Commercial Code, by \Villiam D. Hawkland, 
I) published by the American Law Institute and Ameri-
can Bar Association, ( 1964 edition) , page 420: 
"Except for the notification of any loss or delay 
i11 in transit of the item being collected, which must 
be given within a reasonable time after discovery 
thereof, the banli: must act with regard to its 
other duties before its '' midniyht deadline" or 
run the risk of having acted unseasonably ... " 
(Emphasis added) . 
The Bank had the burden in this case of proving that 
its action was seasonable, but the jury found that the 
action was not seasonable nor within the required time, 
and the Bank was held to have "bought" the check. 
One recent case interpreting this code requirement 
11 is the 1965 Illinois Supreme Court decision of Rock 
Island Auction Sales Inc. vs. Empire Packing Com-
', I pany, 32 Ill. 2d 269, 204 N.E. 2d 721, 18 ALR 3d 1368. 
"I There a check for the purchase of 61 head of cattle was 
deposited in one bank and was sent for collection to the 
payor bank. The buyer's account in the payor bank was 
inadequate to pay the amount on the check, but the payor 
, . bank held the check, relying on the buyer's assurance 
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that additional funds would soon be deposited. It heli! 
the check from a Thursday to the following Tuesday. At 
that time it marked the check "insufficient fw1ds" anJ 
1 
notified the depository bank that the check had bee
11 
, 
dishonored. The depository bank received the ched: 
the following Thursday .About two months later th 
buyer was adjudicated to be a bankrupt and the cheek 
was never paid. In a suit by the seller of the cattle 
against the payor bank it was held that where the item 
was retained beyond the banking deadline the bank hriJ • 
allowed the provisional settlement to become a final 
settlement, and the Bank had lost whatever rights it 1 
originally had to recover on the check. And that bank 
1 
held the dishonored check only one week, while in our 
case the check was held for a period of two and a half 
months. 
Certainly the court erred in awarding the Plaintitl 
any judgment because the settlement had become final 
before the bank acted. 
B. THE UTAH CODE PROVIDES THAT A 
BANK HAS A RIGHT TO A "REFUND 
ONLY 'i\THERE THE BANK IS NOT NEG· 
LIGENT, AND THE JURY AND COUH'l 
HAVING EACH EXPRESSLY FOUND 
THE BANK WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS 
HANDLING OF DEFENDATS' CHECE 
THE BANK HAD NO RIGHT TO A "RE-
FUND." 
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There is a fundamental distinction between a 
·charge hack" and a "refund", which provides a simple 
solution to this dispute. As is stated by numerous 
authorities which will be cited, a bank can "charge-
back" an amount only where the depositor has at least 
llrnt amount in that particular account. It is impossible 
by definition to "chargeback" more funds than are 
1111 Jeposit in an account. However, if depositor has 
insufficient funds to enable a bank to "chargeback" 
a check, the Code than provides the bank the right to 
obtain a "refund" from other funds of the depos~tor 
who has been given temporary or provisional credit 
for the check. The "refund" obviously must come from 
monies not held in the bank account, for by definition 
those monies held in the account can be "charged back', 
momes not in the account must be obtained by "re-
fund." 
These clear distinctions are carefully pointed out 
by the following authorities: First, in reading the Code 
itself, Section 70A-4-212 (I) clearly allows a bank to 
either revoke, chargeback, or obtain refund for a pro-
1isional settlement if the bank acts by its midnight 
deadline. However, sub-section ( 4) specifically permits 
r a "chargeback" even where a bank is negligent, but 
i does not permit a "refund" under such conditions. That 
~ection provides : 
" ( 4) The right to charge-back is not affected 
hy (a) prior use of the credit given for the item; 
or ( b) failure by any bank to exercise ordinary 
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care with respect to the item but any bank 1, 
failing remains liable." · 
The distinction is further clarified in the Official Cullti 
Comment to Section 4-212 ( 1962 Edition), page a~i 
" No. 5. The rule of subsection ( 4) relatil! 
to charge-back (as distinguished from claim 1
1 
refund) applies irrespective of the cause of il11 
nonpayment, and of the person ultimately liahJ, 
for nonpayment. Thus charge-baclt· is permittrn 
even where nonpayment results from the depo.11 
tory bank's own negligence. Any other rul1 
would result in litigation based upon a claim fo1 
wrongful dishonor of other checks of the cusl11·, 
mer, with potential damages far in excess of tl11' 
amount of the item. Any other rule would requir: 
a bank to determine difficult questions of fact. 
. . . " (Emphasis added) . 
The authors of the Code there clearly prm·i<le tha: 
1 
negligence will be overlooked in allowing a chargebatl i 
-but not so in the case of a refund. The reasons behin11 
this dictinction are more fully expressed by the author• 
of the Code in a more complete statement found i1 1 
Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service Reporl1 I 
Digest, Hart and Willier, Vol. l (1968 Revision) :1" 
page 361, under the topic of State Variations," tl:e i 
editorial board mentions that California has adopted~ 1. 
variation of one of the provisions, and in 




" 'The Editorial Board adopts the reasonm~: 
of the California consultants in rejecting th11 : 
variation as follows ... 'Discussion. Subsectioni ·. 
( l) , ( 3) , ( 5) and ( 6) of this section include thi 
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right to obtain refund, as does the title to the 
section. The amendment would add this to sub-
section ( 4). The State Bar Committee report 
gives no reason for the proposed amendment, 
and the California Bankers Committee did not 
consider the amendment necessary. '¥ e wonder 
if the State Bar Committee did not believe that 
the right to a refund had been inadvertently left 
out of subsection ( 4) , since every other time this 
section mentions the right to charge back it is 
coupled with the right to refund. The Official 
Comments, however, show that the omission of 
the right of refund in this subsection ( 4) wa~ 
deliberate. 
'This section gives a collecting bank that has 
made a provisional settlement with its customer 
the right to revoke the settlement if it fails to 
obtain a settlement for an item and to charge 
back the amount credited to the customer's ac-
count or to obtain a refund from its customer. 
'Ve assume that the right to obtain a refund 
will be used in cases when the credit has been 
drawn on, or the provisional settlement was 
made in cash or in some other manner that does 
not produce a book credit subject to a charge-
back. See 2 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., Study of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (1955) 1362. 
The Official Comments indicate that subsection 
( 4) allows a charge-back even in cases where 
the nonpayment results from the depositary 
bank's own negligence. The Comments state: 
'Any other rule would result in litigation based 
upon a claim for wrongful dishonor of other 
checks of the customer, with potential damages 
far in excess of the amount of the item. Any 
other rule would require a bank to determine 
difficult questions of fact.' If we assume that the 
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right of refund will be used when there is nr
1 
book credit in_ the customer's account, the polici 
reason given for allowing a negligent <lepositar~ 
bank _a right of charge-back does not suppu;t 
granti~1g it _a right of refund. In our opiniuq 
there 1s no JUstiticatio11 for giving a negligtiti 
depositary bank a right of refund agai11st a Ctl\-
tomer .' " (Emphasis added). 
In analyzing this comment it is necessary to kee11 
in mind that 4-212 always allows for either a right ol 
"charge back" or a right of "refund'' except for subset· 
tion ( 4). So it might appear that "refund" was inadnr-
tently omitted from ( 4), but the Permanent Editori:tl , 
Board strongly denies such a charge by stating: 
"The Official Code Comments, however, shm1 
that the omission of the right of refund in tlti, 
subsection ( 4) was deliberate." 
They justify allowing a charge back by a negligent 
bank by arguing it is necessary in today's busi11b, 
world in order to keep commercial transactions fro111 
becoming bogged down in needless double-checking 011 . 
every item processed. 
This rule is obviously intended to protect :t ' 
bank who charges back a check to an account a1111 1 
causes outstanding checks to be dishonored became 
of insufficient funds. In such a circumstance tlit 
bank could be potentially liable for damages far iii 1 
excess of the amount of the item if it acts negligenth 
1 
However, in this case the negligent Bank lost it 
right to charge back under any circumstances, f nr i; 
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aJ!rmed the provisional settlement to become final, as 
i!iswssecl in Point II A supra. By failing to act before 
the settlement became final, the Bank also automatic.illy 
losl its right to a refund, as provided in subsection ( 1) . 
These authorities, however, would here deny a 
refund" for an additional reason: while they allow a 
charge back" to a negligent bank in order to keep 
commercial transactions moving within a bank, they 
iiiicl no such commercial urgency to allow a negligent 
bank a "refund". Their final statement clearly expresses 
their view: 
"In our opm1on, there is no justification for 
giving a negligent depositary bank a right of 
refund against a customer." 
The Editorial Board here assumed that a "refund" 
would be used 
'' in cases where the credit has been drawn 
on, or the provisional settlement was made in 
cash or in some other manner that does not pro· 
duce a book credit subject to a charge-back." 
This is the obvious and reasonable assumption, for 
if a ''charge-back" were available to the Bank it would 
1 ohriously be used. If there were money in the Bank 
11'hich could simply be withdrawn as a charge back, 
it would be more quickly accomplished, less expensive 
an<l less complicated than waiting for a depositor to 
pay, either voluntarily or by court order, the amount 
requested by the bank. But in cases where the bank 
rannot simply charge back the deposit the bank must 
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pursue its other legal remedy, which is to obtain 
0 
refund from the depositor. But in that situation therf 
is no justifiable reason for allowing a negligent ba 11 ~ 
to obtain a refund, for that would require a second .,u
1
, 
to correct the wrong done by the Bank's negligence 
Here, however, both the court and jury expressly fou 11 i! 
the Bank was negligent. 
In following the view of the U.C.C. Editorial 
Board, both findings should deny the Plaintiff any 
right to a "refund" because it was negligent, in additiol! 
to acting after the settlement became final. 
The authorities unanimously agree with this inter 
pretation of 4-212. In Anderson's Uniform Commn-
cial Code, Vol. 2, page 77, the author states: 
Section 4-212 :4 - Exercise of right. 
In order to exercise the right of charging hacK 
a credit provisionally given to its customer, the 
collecting bank must act before its midnight demi· 
line. If the bank does not learn of the facts jmti 
f ying such action within time to act before that 
deadline, it may act after the deadline .has passea 
if it does so within a reasonable time after it ' 
learns of the facts justifying such action agairnt 
its customer. 
In any event the collecting bank must exer~i1t 
its right to charge back or obtain a refund bet~rt 
it has received any settlement for the item ,rh1cl1 
is or becomes final. 
I ts right to charge back or obtain a refund 
from its customer is exercised by the colledlll.~ 
bank by returning the item or sending the cm!1 
mer notification of the facts. 
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lu TJcnder's Uniform Commercial Code Service, Forms-
Procedures Y olume, Hart and "\,Yillier, ( 1968 Hevi-
sion), Section 43.07 ( 1) page 4-166: 
"As each bank returns an item or sends notice, 
it will charge back any provisional credit given 
its transferor for the item (Sec. 4-212 ( 1) ) . 
The depositary or an intermediary bank may 
haYe allowed its immediate customer to draw 
against the credit given even before receipt of 
final settlement (proceeds). In such a case, the 
bank has one of three choices: 
( I ) Charge back against other funds in the cus-
tomer's account (sec. 4-212 ( 1), ( 4) ) . 
( ~) Keep the item and demand refund from 
the customer since the bank has a security 
interest in the item to the extent of with-
drawal or advances against it (secs. 4-201 
(1), 4-208, 4-212 (1) (2) ). 
( 3) Keep the item and demand payment from 
the o bligors " 
Certainly the C niform Commercial Code does pre-
sent some unusual problems inasmuch as it has recently 
been adopted in L'tah and some sections of it have not 
been greatly interpreted. The trial judge found himself 
in the difficult position of having to work with statutes 
he could not understand, and so expressed himself 
sereral times: (TR. 286) : 
"THE C 0 CRT : On the legal questions there 
are some advantages to the court making find-
ings and letting somebody appeal, because if I 
grant a new trial we still have this question of 
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this c,har&'eback that's kind of indefiinite in thr 
courts mmd. The Commercial Code or not, it~ 
so ambiguous that an ordinary country J wlrr 
can't tell what they put in there. · 0' 
l\:IR. lVIANN : It's been written by bankers. 
Anybody that wants to make anything ambign-
ous, take a banker. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
lVIR. :MANN: Now when you get right down 
to it, Judge, if this doesn't apply then the old 
law applies, and Utah has several cases saying 
that they've bought the check. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. OLSON: Oh, I don't think the court 
1 
in di ca ted the Commercial Code didn't apply. 
THE COURT:No. I just say I'm so con·. 
fused about that language I can't tell what ih 
about. 
lVfR. OLSON: 'V ell, I am too. 
MR. MANN: If that language won't apply · 
then the old cases would apply that say the)· 
buy the check. . 
(TR. 289): . 
"THE COURT: So there are three ways 11r 
can jump. The more complicated it gets, ma~:be , 
the easiest way out of it is to grant a new tml , 
The disadvantage of that is that the Judge 11 · 
doubtful as to the law on the chargeback. ~lay­
be I'd better make one of you appeal. 
(TR. 292): 
"THE COURT: Not only that, but I can't 












have been throwing that around here. And 
'Vords and Phrases hasn't got a definition of a 
charge back. Nobody knows what a chargeback 
is . 
. l\IR. OLSON: I've indicated in my brief that 
a chargeback is the time-honored practice, and 
the claim for refund is apparently the first time 
it's ever been mentioned in anything. 
THE COURT: But this suit isn't a charge-
back proceeding. 
.MR. OLSON: 'i\T ell, it certainly was. 
l\IR. .MANN: It's a refund. 
THE COURT: Do you call this a charge-
back? This is an action to recover on a-
.MR. OLSON: On an overdraft occurring by 
reason of the chargeback. 
THE COURT: Yes, but that isn't-well, in 
one sense it isn't a chargeback action." 
The court apparently was undecided whether the 
claim and action of Plaintiff was a chargeback, or an 
attempt for a refund, or whether it came under sub-
section ( 5) which allows some other type of action or 
proceeding. (TR. 294): 
"THE COURT: Under this section it dis-
cusses chargeback and refund, and then under 
five it says, '.May bring any other kind of an 
action or proceeding.' So that under that theory 
this action is probably brought under subdivision 
five, if my memory is right of ~hat se~tion. It is·n't 
a charge back action at all. Its a smt to .recover 
on an independent theory, as I look at it. 
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_MR. OLSON: 'Vell, it isn't. Actually 11 
have ref erred t9 that section. It says, "The. failt 
ure of a bank to make a chargeback does not 
affect other remedies." That's what it says. Wt 
elected to make a charge hack. 
1 
THE COURT: Let him read it. Read it out 
loud. 
MR. HADFIELD: It says, "Failure tii 
charge back or claim refu~d does not affect other 
rights of the bank against the customer or othtr 
party." 
lYIR. OLSON: And we charged back. ThP 
evidence is very clear that we made one. . 
THE COURT: You couldn't make a charge-
back. There was no money in the bank. 
MR. OLSON: There was some. 'Ve got 8011 : 
and something. 
THE COURT: 'Vel, I know, but the jury , 
said you lost that by reason of negligence." 
'Vhen the court submitted to the jury the inter· 
rogatories to make special findings it then apparently 
believed that the UCC did have application to nml 
controlled this transaction. In the instructions to the 
jury, (Rec. 37-43) the court defined for the jury the 
fallowing terms: mid-night deadline, collecting Lan~. 
customer, payor bank, depository hank, accord and sati~­
faction. It also provided the jury with copies of sediom ! 
4-202, 4-211, 4-212, 4-213 and defined "notice". None oi 
these definitions or instructions would have been mean· 
ingf ul unless the court expected the jury to consider 
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i]. 
the statutory provisions covered by the Uniform Com-
men:ial Code. Yet, after the jury had made findings 
~~: based on these instructions, the court then held in Con-
1 dusions of law No. 2 that the provisions of the Com-
mercial Code do not cover such a situation. And in 
conclusion No. 3 the court concluded that even if the 
Co<le does apply the bank had the right to proceed in 
spite of the denial of such a right by the Code. The 
ltl' 
011 : 
Plaintiff should be denied any claim for refund-or 
for what amounts to a refund, regardless of the title 
under which such a claim is made. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons it was clearly error 
to grant judgment against the corporate Defendant, 
11





Judgment granted to the Plaintiff and direct the lower 
court to enter a judgment in favor of the Defendant 
In keeping with the verdict of the jury. 
MANN AND HADFIELD 
Walter G. Mann 
Reed W. Hadfield 
Richard F. Gordon 
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